From the logic audit:
- consent rejects sid-less bearers and requires a LIVE hub session
(sessionAlive) before minting codes — a logged-out bearer can no longer
mint downstream tokens inside its TTL
- refresh rotation race closed: consume returns whether THIS call won;
the loser revokes the family (reuse detection now holds under
concurrency)
- error redirects carry iss (RFC 9207) on error responses too
- logout awaits the revocation and no longer returns ok for missing or
forged bearers
From the hacklab/T-HUB fork (diverged at a6843e9):
- 046_file_folders: folder trees (group + personal scope, RLS forced,
workspace-immutability trigger) + created_by on chat_media_archive
- Instagram connector wired into connect + publishing
- outreach contacts: per-collective DM tracking (todo/sent/replied/declined),
RLS forced, role-scoped permissions, audit without message text,
migration renumbered 041→047
- FORCE row-level security on media_assets
The J1 api agent's folder service/controller work continues separately.
The Instagram connector existed but was never registered, so Channels showed
it as "provider unavailable" and publishing could not resolve it.
- Register createInstagramConnector in the connections registry and the
publishing registry; add the connector-runtime publishing policy
(idempotency "none": media_publish has no key, never replay).
- The Facebook app credentials identify the Hub, not a collective: read them
only from INSTAGRAM_CLIENT_ID / INSTAGRAM_CLIENT_SECRET. Drop the
clientId/clientSecret connect fields and stop copying the app secret into
each connection's vault entry. The provider is connectable only when both
are set (connectEnabled + connectNote).
- Fail the connect when several Instagram accounts are granted instead of
silently publishing as the first Page's account.
- Fix the connector package's pre-existing lint errors (it now ships in api).
- Tests: contract cases for env-only credentials and the multi-account
refusal; connections integration case for provider gating and the
Facebook dialog redirect.
- docs/oauth-connect.md: Instagram setup, callback URI and limits.
Not in this change: publishing images needs a public plaintext JPEG URL that
Meta downloads, and storage is client-side encrypted, so presigned S3 URLs
cannot serve it. Until a short-lived media endpoint exists, publishing to
Instagram fails with an explicit error. Token refresh via ig_refresh_token
on graph.facebook.com also needs checking against Facebook Login tokens.
- produceVideo checks every logo overlay key against the workspace's
media_assets, group_assets or branding logo before queueing; a
well-formed content address alone no longer suffices.
- Remove MEDIA_DEBUG_STDERR=1 from the production compose: it wrote raw
ffmpeg stderr to an unrotated file, bypassing redaction.
Migration 042 enables and forces the tenant_isolation policy on
media_assets with an explicit WITH CHECK; media and publishing queries
also scope by app.workspace_id.
From the logic audit (HEAD 04f5f7e):
- P0 CORS: enableCors methods lacked PUT — browsers could not chunk-upload
at all (cross-origin preflight refused)
- P0 chunked: validateUpload enforced the 2 GiB whole-body cap on chunked
completes, so every >2 GiB chunked upload failed after full upload
- P1 presignPut: the SDK's flexible-checksum default added an
x-amz-checksum-crc32 header browsers cannot reproduce; S3Client now uses
requestChecksumCalculation WHEN_REQUIRED
- P1 refresh rotation race: concurrent refreshes both succeeded (consume
ignored rowCount) forking the token family; consume now returns whether
it won and the loser revokes the chain
- P2 logout: awaits the revocation and ignores missing/forged bearers
honestly
Legacy/edge-case video_assets rows without a processing job threw 'has no
processing job' from getVideoStatus — the library detail click 500ed.
VideoStatus.processingJob is now nullable end to end (api type, DTO, web
consumers null-guarded); a jobless asset renders as queued.
Per the adopted qwen38 plan §2 (+ glm53 amendments): video_processing_jobs
kind 'assemble' (claim widened via 044), EdlPlan mirror validation
(lenient-fail), the filter_complex builder (interleaved concat pairs, fit
cover/contain chains, absolute-timeline PNG overlays with enable windows,
VO adelay/sidechain duck, hard-breaking word wrap for card PNGs), and the
runner's assemble path with pre-spawn trim gates, attempt backoff and 15-min
cap. Sources open by magic (SPENC1 kek / SPENC2 direct key) so direct-to-R2
uploads assemble without the api ever seeing bytes. Tests: builder 18,
edl-plan 12, overlay-png 3, runner fakes extended.
POST /video/direct/init|complete: the browser seals (SPENC2) and PUTs
straight to object storage; the api HEAD-checks, registers the unprobed
asset and queues a probe job — video bytes never cross the api box.
Worker side: produce_job_claim widened to probe jobs (042), the runner
gains a probe lane (sealed fetch → SPENC1/SPENC2 open by magic → scratch →
ffprobe → metadata write-back → complete 100), worker storage reads SPENC2
frames via DIRECT_EC_PRIVATE_KEY (inherited through compose appenv), and a
ported ffprobe util. Probe rows carrying input_json fail instead of
stranding; the claim guard no longer strands probe rows as invalid.
getObject decrypts by magic, so feeding its plaintext into openDirectHeader
always failed. getSealedObject exposes raw bytes for the header read;
DirectStorageMembers and the test fakes carry the new member.
For scale: payload bytes go browser → R2 → browser; the api handles keys,
authz and metadata only, so a cheap box can serve thousands of users.
- SPENC2 frame (browser-sealed, P-256 ECDH → HKDF wrap of a per-file CEK,
10 MiG AES-GCM segments): storage.ts gains the reader (magic-branched
getObject), presignPut/headObject, openDirectHeader; sealForDirect is the
reference sealer for cross-implementation tests
- Files API: GET /files/direct/config, POST /files/direct/init (presigned
PUT), POST /files/direct/complete (HEAD-gated commit), POST
/files/:id/direct-download (presigned GET + CEK ticket)
- web: lib/direct-storage (WebCrypto seal/open), lib/files-direct (flows),
dropzone rewritten with a multi-file sequential queue (per-file status,
direct-first with server fallback), file download decrypts in-browser for
direct objects (falls back to streaming)
- video dropzone wired to the chunked ingest API (>10 MiB → init/chunk/
complete), fixing the Cloudflare ~100 MB body cap for large videos
- DIRECT_EC_PRIVATE_KEY (P-256, PKCS8 b64) wired through compose; cross-impl
roundtrip tests prove web-seal ↔ server-open byte compatibility
Files payloads moved to R2 in 041; this removes the remaining oCIS coupling:
- delete the oCIS WebDAV client; verifyWhileStreaming moves to its own
storage-agnostic module (verify-stream.ts)
- group-files: storage_key is the only payload source; legacy rows answer
'retired storage' instead of touching oCIS
- collective share: the ocis-resource item kind is gone (peertube links stay);
share-into-library was R2-backed since the previous commit
- import-drive endpoint removed (no web caller); import-chat (homeserver) stays
- web: Drive tab + embedded oCIS page removed; Library is the Files view
Legacy e2e rows (2) deleted; every remaining archive row is R2-backed.
Cloudflare's proxy plan rejects bodies above ~100 MB, so whole-body video
uploads cannot exceed it no matter the origin limits. Clients now slice into
10 MB chunks: POST /video/upload/init, PUT /video/upload/:id/chunk/:index,
POST /video/upload/:id/complete reassembles to disk, seals, stores to R2 and
runs the normal probe + job pipeline. Max chunked upload: 100 GiB. Tests 17/17.
The Files tab was the only payload path not on object storage, violating the
2026-10-06 directive (object storage is the ONLY media I/O path) — and oCIS's
WebDAV surface is currently 500ing server-side, which made every upload fail.
Uploads now seal + dedupe into R2 via StorageService (SPENC1, content-
addressed); downloads read R2 when storage_key is set, falling back to oCIS
for legacy rows. Share-into-library copies oCIS Drive sources into R2 and
records the real sha256 instead of a placeholder. Migration 041 adds
chat_media_archive.storage_key.
The Files tab dropzone still enforced the old 20 MiB cap client- and
server-side while every other path had moved to 2 GiB. Also corrects the
stale '100 MiB' message on the video upload rejection.
The store's hand-built claim interpolated the lane predicate into the SQL
text while still passing a bind parameter — node-postgres sent 1 param for
a 0-param statement (08P01) on every poll, so the live produce worker
store-errored every ~2s and never claimed. Migration 040 replaces the
inline claim with produce_job_claim(p_lane, p_stale_after): SECURITY
DEFINER (the 035/oidc_refresh_lookup pattern — the poller is lane-global,
FORCE RLS hides every row without a tenant context), atomic FOR UPDATE
SKIP LOCKED with the queued→transcoding bump as the lease, and stale-
transcoding reclaim so a killed worker's rows return to the queue.
produce_job_workspace(p_job_id) discovers the owning tenant for the
follow-up writes, which stay RLS-bound as sp_app. pg-store rewired; store
errors now surface err.message instead of err.name; pg-store tests added.
38/38 producer tests green.
validateBrandingPatch validated storage-key values but never assigned
them into the output — PUT /workspace/branding with a logo/background
silently did nothing, so admins could never set them. Also ACCENT_HEX
gains /i (uppercase hex accepted, canonicalized to lowercase on read).
Tests unpinned from the buggy behavior; 41/41 green.
Until now collectives only existed at registration; an account with a
personal workspace had no path to start one. The creator becomes Owner
and gets a session scoped to the new workspace.
POST /video/import-drive {resourceId} pulls through the oCIS WebDAV
service-account client; POST /video/import-chat {mxcUri} pulls from the
Matrix content repository (MATRIX_MEDIA_TOKEN, homeserver falls back to
ARCHIVE_PROVISIONER_HOMESERVER_URL). Both cap at 256 MiB (buffered v1,
streaming follow-up), store through the same encrypted content-
addressed path as uploads, probe, and audit video.imported with
provenance.
WS0 of the video-producer plan: every group can open a public,
accountless upload box (random token, rotatable, disable switch).
Submitters tick the Creative Commons qualifier; credit name and a
licensing contact are optional free text — contact is visible only in
the moderation surface and never copied onto assets. Intake sniffs
magic bytes (mp4/webm/jpeg/png), caps video 200 MiB / photo 50 MiB,
rate-limits 5/hour per salted IP hash (hash never rendered), dedups by
sha256, caps 5 pending per box, and quarantines everything as pending.
Group managers approve (video → video library via the register+probe
path, photo → group asset) or reject with a note; every step audited.
Migration 035 (RLS + submission_box_lookup/submission_rate_count
definer fns). 4 unit + 4 live-DB tests.
Hub sessions gain an optional sid backed by auth_sessions (login/reissue
write the row; POST /auth/logout revokes it; pre-phase2 tokens are
refused at reissue so revocation applies from the next epoch bump).
The OIDC provider issues rotating refresh tokens (oidc_refresh_tokens,
SHA-256 at rest, family-wide revocation on reuse detection) that live
and die with the consenting Hub session — an oCIS session can no longer
outlive the sign-in that minted it, and Hub logout propagates at the
next refresh instead of the next silent-authorize. Discovery advertises
refresh_token. Migration 034; RLS via the audit_append definer pattern
for the unauthenticated token-endpoint lookup.
A boost to a gated connection (admin1/admin_majority/admin_consensus)
now holds with awaiting_publish_approval on the same publish-phase poll
the publish route uses, instead of executing the reblog. The holder
re-invokes amplify after the pass (hold-and-retry: no durable amplify
queue exists and the poll-close transaction must not do network I/O).
Unset/auto connections behave exactly as before; the route answers 202
on hold, 200 on execute. Adds amplify-governance IT suite (3 live-DB
tests).
Per the owner's spec: each social connection gets publishGovernance in its
fields — unset = manual publish (today), auto = dispatch on approval,
admin1/admin_majority/admin_consensus = a publish-phase chatgov poll
(subject draft_publish, its own open-poll slot, no collision with review
gates). Dispatch holds until the publish poll passes (E3 pre-dispatch
check); auto dispatches on approval. Includes migration 033, the PATCH
/connections/:id/publish-governance route (chatgov.manage), and 19+31 new
tests. Implementation by the branding-panel process (claude/opus), lint
and integration fixes here.
createPublishingCredentialAccessor is execution-fenced (Temporal contexts
only) — the API-process amplify route threw EXECUTION_CREDENTIAL_FENCE.
Use the established PgConnectionStore+vault accessor instead (same trust
level as the archive amplify route's bot-token path).
POST /publishing/drafts/:draftId/amplify { connectionId, kind?: repost|quote }:
the governance gate is the draft state (only approved drafts amplify), the
target is providerMetadata.sourceRemoteRef recorded at creation — never a
caller-supplied id. Connectors resolve from a process-level publishing
registry (vault-backed credentials); capability-checked per kind. Closes
the gap the governance sim documented (boosts fell back to replies).
The live tuwunel does not offer m.login.jwt (the jwt.* flat config keys were
inert), so the JWT broker flow could never work. Pivot: appservice.hub owns
the exclusive hub_* namespace on the homeserver; POST /matrix/session now
registers @hub_<username> with the as_token and mints a single-use
m.login.token via login/get_token (?user_id= impersonation). Optional
MATRIX_SSO_HS_TOKEN authenticates inbound appservice transactions, acked by
the new MatrixAppserviceController sink. Response shape unchanged.
- group-files: origin filter facet; GET /files/:id returns 410 for unavailable
rows after the ACL recheck; fix latent group_members.status filter and unbound
workspace parameter that would 500 listFiles
- archive-bot: markRedacted revokes live group_file_shares rows in-transaction
- new live-DB integration suite for the archive index surface
