# Tactical Media Broadcast Hub — Administrator Guide

For operators running Tactical Media Broadcast Hub for one or more workspaces. Engineering detail lives in [engineering-guide.md](./engineering-guide.md); end-user help in [user-guide.md](./user-guide.md).

---

## 1. Quick start (development)

```bash
pnpm install
docker compose -f infra/docker-compose.yml up -d postgres redis temporal
# dev extras: --profile dev  (adds media-worker stub, mock live source, mock RTMP sink)

pnpm --filter @tactical-media-broadcast-hub/api dev          # API on :3000
pnpm --filter @tactical-media-broadcast-hub/web dev -- -p 3001   # UI on :3001
pnpm --filter @tactical-media-broadcast-hub/scheduler dev   # Temporal worker

curl localhost:3000/healthz                # {"status":"alive"}
curl localhost:3000/readyz                 # per-component: postgres/redis/temporal
```

Default dev ports: API **3000** · Web **3001** · media-worker **3100** · Postgres **5433** (host 5432 was already taken) · Redis 6379 · Temporal 7233 · MinIO 9000 (console 9001) · Prometheus 9090 · Grafana **3001→3000**.

> Docker image pulls can fail when the registry route is degraded (observed: minio/minio denied). Storage/S3 integration tests skip gracefully without an endpoint; everything else runs.

## 2. Environment variables

### API (`apps/api`)

| Variable | Required | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
| `DATABASE_URL` | prod | **App pool** — connect as `sp_app` (RLS-bound). Never the owner. |
| `SUPER_DATABASE_URL` | prod | **Owner pool** — migrations + provisioning only. |
| `SESSION_SECRET` | prod | HMAC key for session tokens. |
| `SUPERPOSTER_KEK` | prod | Vault master KEK, 32 bytes base64. Wraps per-workspace DEKs. |
| `S3_KEK` | prod | Media-encryption KEK, 32 bytes base64. Seals every S3 object. |
| `S3_ENDPOINT` / `S3_REGION` | prod | S3-compatible endpoint (MinIO, AWS, Spaces…). |
| `S3_ACCESS_KEY` / `S3_SECRET_KEY` | prod | Storage credentials. |
| `S3_BUCKET` | no | Default `tactical-media-broadcast-hub-media`. |
| `S3_FORCE_PATH_STYLE` | no | `true` (default) for MinIO; `false` for AWS virtual-host style. |
| `OIDC_ISSUER` / `OIDC_CLIENT_ID` / `OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET` / `OIDC_REDIRECT_URI` | prod | Any compliant OIDC IdP (Authentik, Keycloak). |
| `TEMPORAL_ADDRESS` / `TEMPORAL_NAMESPACE` | no | Default `localhost:7233` / `default`. |
| `POSTGRES_HOST/PORT`, `REDIS_HOST/PORT` | no | Readiness probes. Default localhost, pg port **5433**. |
| `OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT` | no | Tracing to the collector; absent = disabled. |
| `LOG_LEVEL` | no | pino level, default `info`. |

In development, missing KEKs derive stable local fallbacks; **in production the API refuses to start without both KEKs and `SESSION_SECRET`** — encryption cannot be silently skipped.

## 3. Key management (critical)

Generate each key once, store in your secret manager, and back them up **separately from the database**:

```bash
openssl rand -base64 32   # → SUPERPOSTER_KEK  (credential vault)
openssl rand -base64 32   # → S3_KEK           (media encryption)
openssl rand -base64 32   # → SESSION_SECRET
```

- **Lose `SUPERPOSTER_KEK`** → all stored provider tokens are unrecoverable; users must reconnect accounts.
- **Lose `S3_KEK`** → the entire media archive is unrecoverable even though the S3 bytes remain.
- **Rotation:** `SUPERPOSTER_KEK` rotation re-wraps DEKs via the vault's `rotate()`. `S3_KEK` rotation re-wraps per-object CEKs without re-encrypting bodies (roadmap item; see engineering guide §3.8).
- Both KEKs are distinct from database credentials; changing DB passwords never affects them.

## 4. Database

### 4.1 Roles
- `tmbh` (docker `POSTGRES_USER`) — superuser, **owner pool only** (migrations via `SUPER_DATABASE_URL`).
- `sp_app` — created by migration `003_app_role.sql`; `NOSUPERUSER`, grants on all tables/sequences. **All runtime connections.** `FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY` means even the table owner cannot silently bypass tenancy.

### 4.2 Migrations
Ordered SQL files in `apps/api/migrations/` — currently **001–034** (001 tenants + RLS + audit chain · 002 RBAC seed · 003 sp_app role · 004 NULLIF policy fix · 005 epoch trigger fix · 006 publishing · 019 publishing integration · 024 chatgov · 029 group files · 031 personal workspaces · 033 publish governance · 034 auth sessions + OIDC refresh tokens). Idempotent runner (`apps/api/src/db/migrate.ts`) tracks `schema_migrations`:

```bash
cd apps/api && SUPER_DATABASE_URL='postgresql://tmbh:…@localhost:5433/tmbh' \
  pnpm exec tsx -e 'import {runMigrations} from "./src/db/migrate.js"; runMigrations("./migrations").then(m => console.log("applied:", m))'
```
Integration tests apply migrations automatically when `SUPER_DATABASE_URL` is set.

### 4.3 Backups
- Nightly `pg_dump` of the `tmbh` DB.
- S3 bucket lifecycle/replication per your provider (objects are already encrypted client-side; provider snapshots never see plaintext).
- **KEKs** (§3) — without them backups are unrecoverable.

## 5. Rate & capacity settings (per connection)

Post/rate caps are **settings, never hardcoded**. Three layers, highest wins:

1. **Per-connection override** (workspace settings) — e.g. a news account with elevated API tier declares `dailyPostCap: 100`.
2. **Deployment env** — `CONNECTOR_RATE_<PROVIDER>_RPS`, `CONNECTOR_RATE_<PROVIDER>_DAILY_POSTS`, `CONNECTOR_RATE_<PROVIDER>_COMMENTS_PER_HOUR`, `CONNECTOR_RATE_<PROVIDER>_TIER_NOTE` (provider upper-cased, dashes→underscores: `CONNECTOR_RATE_INSTAGRAM_DAILY_POSTS`).
3. **Documented provider defaults** (standard-access caps: Instagram 25 posts/24h, Threads 250/24h — Meta enforces these server-side).

Truth model: raising a value **does not bypass the provider** — it declares what your tier actually permits (news-publisher/advanced-access programs raise real limits) so the scheduler paces within true capacity. The UI warns (`exceedsDocumentedCap`) when an override exceeds the documented cap: the provider will reject the excess unless your tier genuinely allows it.

## 6. Workspaces, roles & permissions

37 permissions across 10 seeded roles (Owner, Admin, Publisher, Editor, Approver, Analyst, Moderator, VideoPublisher, StreamOperator, BroadcastOperator). Role changes bump the workspace `authz_epoch`; affected live sessions fail closed on their next request. Audit every membership change (hash-chained; `audit_verify_chain()` detects tampering).

## 6.1 Publish governance (who signs off a post)

Each social connection carries a publish-governance setting. Manage per connection (requires `chatgov.manage`):

```bash
curl -X PATCH https://api.occupymedia.cc/connections/$CONN/publish-governance \
  -H "authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" -H 'content-type: application/json' \
  -d '{"publishGovernance": "admin1"}'     # auto | admin1 | admin_majority | admin_consensus | null
```

| Mode | Who signs off the publish |
|---|---|
| `null` (unset) | manual: anyone with `publication.publish` |
| `auto` | nobody — dispatch fires when the draft's approval lands |
| `admin1` | one admin, via a publish poll |
| `admin_majority` | majority of admins (snapshot at poll open) |
| `admin_consensus` | every admin; one veto blocks at once |

While held, the publish/boost route answers `202 awaiting_publish_approval` with the poll id; the poll closes after a day and rejects unanswered. Reconnecting an account keeps the setting. Changing the setting does not cancel an already-open poll. The Mastodon **boost** route runs behind the same gate.

## 6.2 Control Room & media workers

The Live Control Room drives real encoders — gate it carefully. Permissions: `media.view`/`director.view` (watch), `director.take` (TAKE/CUT/PST), `director.lock_program`, `director.override_auto`, `director.change_layout` (overlays), `media.manage` (desired spec).

Operational notes:

- A channel must be **assigned to a media worker** before any switch succeeds ("channel is not assigned to a media worker"). Configure ingest sources and scenes first; select the preview bus.
- Capacity admission is part of every command transaction: an over-quota start is queued (`PENDING_CAPACITY`) and a stop offers its freed capacity to that queue.
- Preview URLs are signed capabilities on the API origin — set `PUBLIC_ORIGIN` correctly or same-origin checks reject the browser's preview requests.
- The worker reports the **realized version**; the UI's tally says "Tally unknown" until the worker confirms. If panels show thumbnails but never go live, check native HLS support and that preview signatures aren't being stripped by a proxy.
- Every switch is idempotent (`Idempotency-Key`) and lands in the audit chain as `director.<operation>` — incident review replays commands from the audit log.

## 6.3 Files SSO (Hub as the OIDC issuer for oCIS)
`files.occupymedia.cc` signs in through the Hub: the issuer is `https://api.occupymedia.cc/oidc`, client id `web`, PKCE only, auto-consent for that first-party client. Phase 2 (migration 034) makes sessions revocable and adds rotating refresh tokens bound to the Hub session — Hub logout reaches Drive within one access-token TTL (≤1 h). Operational notes:

- `OIDC_KEY_DIR` must be a persistent volume (the API generates and seals its ES256 keyset there on first boot; losing it logs every Drive session out).
- `FILES_OCID_USER` and `OIDC_RESERVED_USERNAMES` are never claimable as files accounts (`admin` is reserved by default).
- Sign-in requires an **active membership** and a username usable as an account name; otherwise the consent endpoint fails closed.

## 6.4 Verification harnesses

```bash
RADAR_EMAIL=… RADAR_PASSWORD=… node scripts/e2e/governance-sim.mjs   # S1–S9 governance scenarios, live
node scripts/e2e/brand-palette-check.mjs                             # fails on blue-family pixels in embedded surfaces
```

The governance sim is re-runnable (all fixtures prefixed `e2e-gov-`) and writes a report to `/tmp/opencode/workers/GOV-SIM-REPORT.md` by default.

## 7. Monitoring & health

- `GET /healthz` — liveness (no dependencies).
- `GET /readyz` — readiness: TCP probes for postgres/redis/temporal, `503` + component detail when degraded.
- Grafana `http://localhost:3001` (anonymous admin in dev) with Prometheus datasource pre-provisioned; scrape targets for API and media-worker are in `infra/prometheus/prometheus.yml`.
- Logs: structured JSON; credential-shaped keys are redacted at the logger. Never log raw tokens — the scrubbing is defense-in-depth, not permission.

## 8. Security operations checklist

- [ ] Both KEKs generated, stored in secret manager, backed up off-box.
- [ ] `DATABASE_URL` uses `sp_app`, never the owner role.
- [ ] OIDC issuer uses HTTPS; redirect URI exact.
- [ ] Postgres not exposed beyond the host (compose binds 5433 locally).
- [ ] Audit-chain verification scheduled (a cron calling `audit_verify_chain` per workspace and alerting on `false`).
- [ ] Connector credentials rotate on schedule (vault `rotate()`).
- [ ] S3 bucket: no public access; presigned URLs are the only sharing path.

## 9. Troubleshooting

| Symptom | Cause | Fix |
|---|---|---|
| API won't start, "S3_KEK is required" | production without KEKs | set both KEKs (§3) |
| `tenant context mismatch` errors | SECURITY DEFINER call without matching `withTenant` context | code bug — file an issue; do not grant sp_app more privileges |
| Sessions mass-invalidated after role change | `authz_epoch` bump (by design) | users re-login once |
| Scheduler idle, posts stuck `pending` | Temporal down when scheduled | worker sweeps pending rows on startup; verify `TEMPORAL_ADDRESS` |
| Postgres port conflict | host 5432 occupied | compose maps 5433; set `POSTGRES_PORT` accordingly |
| MinIO image pull denied | registry degradation | retry later or point `S3_ENDPOINT` at any S3 |
| Streams columns empty in UI | mock-registry data (API not wired yet) | expected pre-WP3-integration |

## 10. Upgrading

1. Back up DB + confirm KEK backups (§4.3).
2. `git pull && pnpm install`.
3. Run migrations (§4.2) — additive by design; expand/contract policy documented per migration. **Order matters**: 033 must exist before the scheduler that queries its columns rolls, or the E3 pre-dispatch check fails open.
4. Restart API, then scheduler.
5. Watch `/readyz` and the audit chain verification.

**Session note (migration 034+):** tokens issued before 034 carry no `sid`; they keep working until expiry but `reissue` refuses them — after upgrading, users re-login at their next epoch bump or within 12 h at the latest. Logout only revokes server-side for tokens issued after the upgrade.