Per the adopted qwen38 plan §2 (+ glm53 amendments): video_processing_jobs
kind 'assemble' (claim widened via 044), EdlPlan mirror validation
(lenient-fail), the filter_complex builder (interleaved concat pairs, fit
cover/contain chains, absolute-timeline PNG overlays with enable windows,
VO adelay/sidechain duck, hard-breaking word wrap for card PNGs), and the
runner's assemble path with pre-spawn trim gates, attempt backoff and 15-min
cap. Sources open by magic (SPENC1 kek / SPENC2 direct key) so direct-to-R2
uploads assemble without the api ever seeing bytes. Tests: builder 18,
edl-plan 12, overlay-png 3, runner fakes extended.
POST /video/direct/init|complete: the browser seals (SPENC2) and PUTs
straight to object storage; the api HEAD-checks, registers the unprobed
asset and queues a probe job — video bytes never cross the api box.
Worker side: produce_job_claim widened to probe jobs (042), the runner
gains a probe lane (sealed fetch → SPENC1/SPENC2 open by magic → scratch →
ffprobe → metadata write-back → complete 100), worker storage reads SPENC2
frames via DIRECT_EC_PRIVATE_KEY (inherited through compose appenv), and a
ported ffprobe util. Probe rows carrying input_json fail instead of
stranding; the claim guard no longer strands probe rows as invalid.
The Files tab was the only payload path not on object storage, violating the
2026-10-06 directive (object storage is the ONLY media I/O path) — and oCIS's
WebDAV surface is currently 500ing server-side, which made every upload fail.
Uploads now seal + dedupe into R2 via StorageService (SPENC1, content-
addressed); downloads read R2 when storage_key is set, falling back to oCIS
for legacy rows. Share-into-library copies oCIS Drive sources into R2 and
records the real sha256 instead of a placeholder. Migration 041 adds
chat_media_archive.storage_key.
The store's hand-built claim interpolated the lane predicate into the SQL
text while still passing a bind parameter — node-postgres sent 1 param for
a 0-param statement (08P01) on every poll, so the live produce worker
store-errored every ~2s and never claimed. Migration 040 replaces the
inline claim with produce_job_claim(p_lane, p_stale_after): SECURITY
DEFINER (the 035/oidc_refresh_lookup pattern — the poller is lane-global,
FORCE RLS hides every row without a tenant context), atomic FOR UPDATE
SKIP LOCKED with the queued→transcoding bump as the lease, and stale-
transcoding reclaim so a killed worker's rows return to the queue.
produce_job_workspace(p_job_id) discovers the owning tenant for the
follow-up writes, which stay RLS-bound as sp_app. pg-store rewired; store
errors now surface err.message instead of err.name; pg-store tests added.
38/38 producer tests green.
Until now collectives only existed at registration; an account with a
personal workspace had no path to start one. The creator becomes Owner
and gets a session scoped to the new workspace.
WS0 of the video-producer plan: every group can open a public,
accountless upload box (random token, rotatable, disable switch).
Submitters tick the Creative Commons qualifier; credit name and a
licensing contact are optional free text — contact is visible only in
the moderation surface and never copied onto assets. Intake sniffs
magic bytes (mp4/webm/jpeg/png), caps video 200 MiB / photo 50 MiB,
rate-limits 5/hour per salted IP hash (hash never rendered), dedups by
sha256, caps 5 pending per box, and quarantines everything as pending.
Group managers approve (video → video library via the register+probe
path, photo → group asset) or reject with a note; every step audited.
Migration 035 (RLS + submission_box_lookup/submission_rate_count
definer fns). 4 unit + 4 live-DB tests.
Hub sessions gain an optional sid backed by auth_sessions (login/reissue
write the row; POST /auth/logout revokes it; pre-phase2 tokens are
refused at reissue so revocation applies from the next epoch bump).
The OIDC provider issues rotating refresh tokens (oidc_refresh_tokens,
SHA-256 at rest, family-wide revocation on reuse detection) that live
and die with the consenting Hub session — an oCIS session can no longer
outlive the sign-in that minted it, and Hub logout propagates at the
next refresh instead of the next silent-authorize. Discovery advertises
refresh_token. Migration 034; RLS via the audit_append definer pattern
for the unauthenticated token-endpoint lookup.
Per the owner's spec: each social connection gets publishGovernance in its
fields — unset = manual publish (today), auto = dispatch on approval,
admin1/admin_majority/admin_consensus = a publish-phase chatgov poll
(subject draft_publish, its own open-poll slot, no collision with review
gates). Dispatch holds until the publish poll passes (E3 pre-dispatch
check); auto dispatches on approval. Includes migration 033, the PATCH
/connections/:id/publish-governance route (chatgov.manage), and 19+31 new
tests. Implementation by the branding-panel process (claude/opus), lint
and integration fixes here.
Wires the three parallel group-cloud tracks to one surface and fixes the
seams between them:
- chat_media_archive.room_id becomes nullable (direct web uploads have no
Matrix room yet — the contract's null-event pattern extends to the room);
core GroupFile.roomId and ArchiveEntryInput.roomId follow.
- mime_class gains 'archive' (zip) across the 029 CHECK, validation
MIME_CLASSES and the bot classifier — one vocabulary everywhere.
- registerArchiveEntry claim keys are null-safe for room-less uploads.
- New: POST /files/groups/:groupId/upload — FileInterceptor (20 MiB) streams
through magic-byte sniffing, library-safe naming, oCIS upload and the
metadata index, behind group-membership ACL (Owner/Admin bypass).
- safeFileName/sniffMime promoted to packages/core (file-names.ts,
file-mime.ts) so the bot and the api share one implementation; the bot's
local modules become re-export shims; @types/node added to core.
Verified: api typecheck clean, group-files 22/22, bot 74/74, web typecheck
clean; 029 re-applied clean on a fresh scratch DB (room_id nullable,
archive class, claim_key unique all confirmed in the catalog).
Self-hosted multi-platform broadcast newsroom for activist collectives:
publishing pipeline with group approval and DST-proof scheduling, TweetDeck-style
column wall with hostile-content-safe rendering, live control room with Auto
Director, bridged chat governance with polls and quorum, distributed sandboxed
transcode workers, encrypted content-addressed archive, monthly analytics.
MIT licensed. See README.md and docs/.
