- produceVideo checks every logo overlay key against the workspace's
media_assets, group_assets or branding logo before queueing; a
well-formed content address alone no longer suffices.
- Remove MEDIA_DEBUG_STDERR=1 from the production compose: it wrote raw
ffmpeg stderr to an unrotated file, bypassing redaction.
Migration 042 enables and forces the tenant_isolation policy on
media_assets with an explicit WITH CHECK; media and publishing queries
also scope by app.workspace_id.
A list of public accounts a collective wants to write to (artists,
collectives, public figures), with a drafted message per contact and the
state of the conversation: todo, sent, replied, declined.
The Hub does not send these messages. "Copy & open profile" puts the
draft on the clipboard and opens the profile; a person sends it from the
platform's own DM box and marks it sent. Unsolicited bulk DMs break the
terms of every commercial platform and get accounts restricted, and
Instagram's API cannot open a conversation at all.
API (OutreachModule):
- migration 041: outreach_contacts, RLS enabled + forced with WITH CHECK,
unique per (workspace, platform, lower(handle)); permissions
outreach.view (Owner/Admin/Editor/Moderator) and outreach.manage
(Owner/Admin/Editor).
- GET/POST/PATCH/DELETE /outreach/contacts; bulk import up to 500 rows,
known accounts skipped. Audit records list changes and status moves,
never the message text.
Web: /outreach page (sidebar + More), CSV import, {name}/{handle}
template for pending contacts, status filters, a daily counter that
warns past 20 first messages.
Tests: service and request parsing with the DB faked; the migration and
every service query were also run against PGlite as the non-superuser
app role (tenant isolation, conflict skip, status timestamps).
The Instagram connector existed but was never registered, so Channels showed
it as "provider unavailable" and publishing could not resolve it.
- Register createInstagramConnector in the connections registry and the
publishing registry; add the connector-runtime publishing policy
(idempotency "none": media_publish has no key, never replay).
- The Facebook app credentials identify the Hub, not a collective: read them
only from INSTAGRAM_CLIENT_ID / INSTAGRAM_CLIENT_SECRET. Drop the
clientId/clientSecret connect fields and stop copying the app secret into
each connection's vault entry. The provider is connectable only when both
are set (connectEnabled + connectNote).
- Fail the connect when several Instagram accounts are granted instead of
silently publishing as the first Page's account.
- Fix the connector package's pre-existing lint errors (it now ships in api).
- Tests: contract cases for env-only credentials and the multi-account
refusal; connections integration case for provider gating and the
Facebook dialog redirect.
- docs/oauth-connect.md: Instagram setup, callback URI and limits.
Not in this change: publishing images needs a public plaintext JPEG URL that
Meta downloads, and storage is client-side encrypted, so presigned S3 URLs
cannot serve it. Until a short-lived media endpoint exists, publishing to
Instagram fails with an explicit error. Token refresh via ig_refresh_token
on graph.facebook.com also needs checking against Facebook Login tokens.
The store's hand-built claim interpolated the lane predicate into the SQL
text while still passing a bind parameter — node-postgres sent 1 param for
a 0-param statement (08P01) on every poll, so the live produce worker
store-errored every ~2s and never claimed. Migration 040 replaces the
inline claim with produce_job_claim(p_lane, p_stale_after): SECURITY
DEFINER (the 035/oidc_refresh_lookup pattern — the poller is lane-global,
FORCE RLS hides every row without a tenant context), atomic FOR UPDATE
SKIP LOCKED with the queued→transcoding bump as the lease, and stale-
transcoding reclaim so a killed worker's rows return to the queue.
produce_job_workspace(p_job_id) discovers the owning tenant for the
follow-up writes, which stay RLS-bound as sp_app. pg-store rewired; store
errors now surface err.message instead of err.name; pg-store tests added.
38/38 producer tests green.
validateBrandingPatch validated storage-key values but never assigned
them into the output — PUT /workspace/branding with a logo/background
silently did nothing, so admins could never set them. Also ACCENT_HEX
gains /i (uppercase hex accepted, canonicalized to lowercase on read).
Tests unpinned from the buggy behavior; 41/41 green.
Until now collectives only existed at registration; an account with a
personal workspace had no path to start one. The creator becomes Owner
and gets a session scoped to the new workspace.
POST /video/import-drive {resourceId} pulls through the oCIS WebDAV
service-account client; POST /video/import-chat {mxcUri} pulls from the
Matrix content repository (MATRIX_MEDIA_TOKEN, homeserver falls back to
ARCHIVE_PROVISIONER_HOMESERVER_URL). Both cap at 256 MiB (buffered v1,
streaming follow-up), store through the same encrypted content-
addressed path as uploads, probe, and audit video.imported with
provenance.
WS0 of the video-producer plan: every group can open a public,
accountless upload box (random token, rotatable, disable switch).
Submitters tick the Creative Commons qualifier; credit name and a
licensing contact are optional free text — contact is visible only in
the moderation surface and never copied onto assets. Intake sniffs
magic bytes (mp4/webm/jpeg/png), caps video 200 MiB / photo 50 MiB,
rate-limits 5/hour per salted IP hash (hash never rendered), dedups by
sha256, caps 5 pending per box, and quarantines everything as pending.
Group managers approve (video → video library via the register+probe
path, photo → group asset) or reject with a note; every step audited.
Migration 035 (RLS + submission_box_lookup/submission_rate_count
definer fns). 4 unit + 4 live-DB tests.
Hub sessions gain an optional sid backed by auth_sessions (login/reissue
write the row; POST /auth/logout revokes it; pre-phase2 tokens are
refused at reissue so revocation applies from the next epoch bump).
The OIDC provider issues rotating refresh tokens (oidc_refresh_tokens,
SHA-256 at rest, family-wide revocation on reuse detection) that live
and die with the consenting Hub session — an oCIS session can no longer
outlive the sign-in that minted it, and Hub logout propagates at the
next refresh instead of the next silent-authorize. Discovery advertises
refresh_token. Migration 034; RLS via the audit_append definer pattern
for the unauthenticated token-endpoint lookup.
A boost to a gated connection (admin1/admin_majority/admin_consensus)
now holds with awaiting_publish_approval on the same publish-phase poll
the publish route uses, instead of executing the reblog. The holder
re-invokes amplify after the pass (hold-and-retry: no durable amplify
queue exists and the poll-close transaction must not do network I/O).
Unset/auto connections behave exactly as before; the route answers 202
on hold, 200 on execute. Adds amplify-governance IT suite (3 live-DB
tests).
Per the owner's spec: each social connection gets publishGovernance in its
fields — unset = manual publish (today), auto = dispatch on approval,
admin1/admin_majority/admin_consensus = a publish-phase chatgov poll
(subject draft_publish, its own open-poll slot, no collision with review
gates). Dispatch holds until the publish poll passes (E3 pre-dispatch
check); auto dispatches on approval. Includes migration 033, the PATCH
/connections/:id/publish-governance route (chatgov.manage), and 19+31 new
tests. Implementation by the branding-panel process (claude/opus), lint
and integration fixes here.
createPublishingCredentialAccessor is execution-fenced (Temporal contexts
only) — the API-process amplify route threw EXECUTION_CREDENTIAL_FENCE.
Use the established PgConnectionStore+vault accessor instead (same trust
level as the archive amplify route's bot-token path).
POST /publishing/drafts/:draftId/amplify { connectionId, kind?: repost|quote }:
the governance gate is the draft state (only approved drafts amplify), the
target is providerMetadata.sourceRemoteRef recorded at creation — never a
caller-supplied id. Connectors resolve from a process-level publishing
registry (vault-backed credentials); capability-checked per kind. Closes
the gap the governance sim documented (boosts fell back to replies).
The live tuwunel does not offer m.login.jwt (the jwt.* flat config keys were
inert), so the JWT broker flow could never work. Pivot: appservice.hub owns
the exclusive hub_* namespace on the homeserver; POST /matrix/session now
registers @hub_<username> with the as_token and mints a single-use
m.login.token via login/get_token (?user_id= impersonation). Optional
MATRIX_SSO_HS_TOKEN authenticates inbound appservice transactions, acked by
the new MatrixAppserviceController sink. Response shape unchanged.
- group-files: origin filter facet; GET /files/:id returns 410 for unavailable
rows after the ACL recheck; fix latent group_members.status filter and unbound
workspace parameter that would 500 listFiles
- archive-bot: markRedacted revokes live group_file_shares rows in-transaction
- new live-DB integration suite for the archive index surface
page.tsx now calls the real backend: GET /files with groupId/name/mimeClass/
cursor/limit (origin filter dropped — the api has no origin param), shares
tracked as ShareCreated (revoke by id), retention mapped to the orthogonal
legalHold model, downloads by item.name, samples reshaped to the wire
contract.
GroupFile gains mimeClass (the indexed coarse class the row icon and the
filter depend on): core contract, service row mapper, parseGroupFile guard,
test fixture, UI types — one vocabulary end to end. parseGroupFile's roomId
becomes null-tolerant to match direct-upload rows (mapping input stays
strict).
Verified: core build clean, api typecheck 0 errors + group-files 22/22,
web typecheck 0 errors.
Wires the three parallel group-cloud tracks to one surface and fixes the
seams between them:
- chat_media_archive.room_id becomes nullable (direct web uploads have no
Matrix room yet — the contract's null-event pattern extends to the room);
core GroupFile.roomId and ArchiveEntryInput.roomId follow.
- mime_class gains 'archive' (zip) across the 029 CHECK, validation
MIME_CLASSES and the bot classifier — one vocabulary everywhere.
- registerArchiveEntry claim keys are null-safe for room-less uploads.
- New: POST /files/groups/:groupId/upload — FileInterceptor (20 MiB) streams
through magic-byte sniffing, library-safe naming, oCIS upload and the
metadata index, behind group-membership ACL (Owner/Admin bypass).
- safeFileName/sniffMime promoted to packages/core (file-names.ts,
file-mime.ts) so the bot and the api share one implementation; the bot's
local modules become re-export shims; @types/node added to core.
Verified: api typecheck clean, group-files 22/22, bot 74/74, web typecheck
clean; 029 re-applied clean on a fresh scratch DB (room_id nullable,
archive class, claim_key unique all confirmed in the catalog).
Self-hosted multi-platform broadcast newsroom for activist collectives:
publishing pipeline with group approval and DST-proof scheduling, TweetDeck-style
column wall with hostile-content-safe rendering, live control room with Auto
Director, bridged chat governance with polls and quorum, distributed sandboxed
transcode workers, encrypted content-addressed archive, monthly analytics.
MIT licensed. See README.md and docs/.
